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Should	the	EU	be	concerned	about	a	possible
‘Polexit’?
The	Polish	government	has	come	into	conflict	with	the	EU’s	institutions	on	several	fronts,	notably
over	judicial	reforms	and	the	relocation	of	refugees	during	the	migration	crisis.	Aleks	Szczerbiak
explains	that	although	opponents	of	the	government	accuse	it	of	undermining	the	country’s	ties	with
the	EU,	its	supporters	argue	that	the	ruling	party	is	committed	to	defending	national	interests	and
sovereignty	within	a	reformed	Union.	Overall,	while	Poles	are	still	overwhelmingly	pro-EU,	this
support	is	shallow	and	increasingly	instrumental.
Polish	PM	Beata	Szydło	at	a	European	Council	meeting	in	June,	Credit:	European	Council	(CC	BY-NC-ND	2.0)
On	the	face	of	it,	Poles	are	overwhelmingly	pro-EU.	A	June	survey	by	the	CBOS	polling	agency	found	that	88%	of
respondents	supported	their	country’s	EU	membership	compared	with	only	9%	who	were	against.
The	right-wing	Law	and	Justice	(PiS)	grouping,	Poland’s	ruling	party	since	the	October	2015	election,	is
committed	to	defending	Polish	interests	and	sovereignty	robustly	within	the	EU,	especially	in	the	moral-cultural
sphere	where	it	rejects	what	it	sees	as	a	hegemonic	EU	liberal-left	consensus	that	it	believes	undermines	the
country’s	traditional	values	and	national	identity.	Law	and	Justice	is	also	anti-federalist	and	has	articulated	an
increasingly	fundamental	and	principled	critique	of	further	European	integration.
Nonetheless,	although	it	has	been	labelled	Eurosceptic,	the	dominant	view	within	Law	and	Justice	is	still	that	it	is
in	Poland’s	interests	to	remain	an	EU	member	and	reform	the	organisation	from	within.	No	major	political
grouping	questions	continued	EU	membership	and	the	only	calls	for	‘Polexit’,	following	the	UK’s	example	in
leaving	the	Union,	have	come	from	fringe	politicians	on	the	radical	right.	However,	the	Law	and	Justice
government	has	found	itself	in	conflict	with	the	EU	institutions	and	major	European	powers	on	several	fronts.
Conflict	with	Brussels
In	January	2016,	the	European	Commission	initiated	an	unprecedented	‘Article	7’	investigation	into	Poland,	a
procedure	which	it	can	invoke	against	any	EU	member	state	where	it	feels	there	is	a	‘systemic	threat’	to
democracy	and	the	rule	of	law.	This	followed	the	outbreak	of	a	bitter	domestic	political	and	legal	dispute	over	the
membership	and	competencies	of	Poland’s	constitutional	tribunal.	The	row	escalated	this	July	when	the
Commission	asked	the	Polish	government	to	justify	a	series	of	laws	reforming	the	judiciary.
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Two	of	these	were	vetoed	by	Law	and	Justice-backed	Polish	President	Andrzej	Duda,	but	the	Commission
nonetheless	gave	Poland	a	month	to	address	its	concerns	or	face	the	prospect	of	a	recommendation	to	the
European	Council	that	sanctions	be	imposed	which,	in	the	worst-case	scenario,	could	mean	suspending
Warsaw’s	voting	rights.	Law	and	Justice	rejected	the	Commission’s	claims	as	biased	and	as	representing	political
interference	in	Polish	domestic	affairs.	Unanimity	is	required	in	the	Council	to	trigger	sanctions	and	the	Hungarian
government,	for	one,	has	made	it	clear	that	it	will	oppose	such	moves.	Consequently,	in	a	separate	action	the
Commission	also	launched	an	infringement	procedure	against	Poland	arguing	that	its	judicial	reforms	breached
EU	law.
In	June,	the	Commission	initiated	another	EU	law	infringement	action	against	Poland	(together	with	the	Czech
Republic	and	Hungary)	for	its	refusal	to	implement	a	plan	agreed	at	a	September	2015	EU	summit	on	the
compulsory	relocation	of	Middle	Eastern	and	North	African	migrants	located	in	Greece	and	Italy.	This	proposal
was	accepted	by	Law	and	Justice’s	predecessor,	the	centrist	Civic	Platform	(PO)	which	was	Poland’s	ruling	party
from	2007-15	and	is	currently	the	main	opposition	grouping.
Although	Law	and	Justice	was	against	the	EU	plan	when	in	opposition,	it	initially	agreed	to	implement	it	but	then
suspended	the	process,	arguing	that	procedures	for	vetting	migrants	were	insufficient	to	guarantee	Polish
security.	In	July,	the	Polish	government	also	refused	to	implement	a	European	Court	of	Justice	order	to	stop
logging	in	the	primeval	Białowieża	Forest,	arguing	that	it	was	acting	in	line	with	the	injunction	because	it	was	only
removing	trees	affected	by	a	plague	of	spruce	bark	beetles	on	public	safety	grounds.
Poland’s	clashes	with	the	EU	institutions	have	been	one	of	the	factors	contributing	to	a	worsening	of	its	already-
strained	bilateral	relations	with	the	main	European	powers.	In	August,	French	President	Emmanuel	Macron
accused	the	Polish	government	of	isolating	itself	within	the	EU	by	undermining	European	solidarity	and
democratic	values.	Mr	Macron’s	remarks	came	as	he	omitted	Poland	(and	Hungary)	from	a	trip	to	central	and
Eastern	Europe	to	mobilise	support	for	new	EU	rules	which	would	limit	the	rights	of	temporary	(so-called	‘posted’)
workers,	which	Warsaw	says	will	hit	Poles	employed	in	Western	Europe	particularly	hard.	At	the	same	time,
German	Chancellor	Angela	Merkel,	who	had	previously	kept	a	low	profile	in	the	ongoing	row	over	the	Article	7
procedure,	also	appeared	to	be	moving	closer	towards	supporting	the	Commission	more	openly	on	this	issue.
Slow	motion	‘Polexit’	or	defending	Polish	interests?
The	government’s	opponents,	Civic	Platform	and	the	smaller	liberal	‘Modern’	(Nowoczesna)	grouping,	argue	that
Law	and	Justice	has	marginalised	Poland	within	the	EU’s	decision-making	structures	to	such	an	extent	that	the
Union	will	be	much	less	engaged	in	the	country’s	future	development.	They	warn	that	Poland	could	end	up	on	the
EU’s	periphery	as	the	major	European	powers	have	signalled	that	they	favour	a	‘multi-speed’	Europe	with	the
locus	of	decision-making	and	integration	likely	to	develop	even	more	around	the	Eurozone	hard	core.
Although	it	has	not	ruled	out	Eurozone	accession	in	principle,	Law	and	Justice	argues	that,	given	the	single
currency’s	huge	problems,	it	cannot	envisage	any	point	in	the	foreseeable	future	when	it	would	be	advantageous
for	Poland	to	adopt	the	euro.	Drawing	analogies	with	the	process	that	led	to	the	UK’s	June	2016	Brexit
referendum,	the	government’s	critics	argue	that	by	mobilising	Euroscepticism	for	short-term	domestic	political
advantage	and	treating	every	action	by	EU	institutions	as	a	hostile	one,	Law	and	Justice	could	bring	about	a	slow
motion	‘Polexit’	by	progressively	undermining	confidence	in,	and	weakening	Poland’s	ties	with,	the	Union.
The	government’s	supporters	respond	that	Law	and	Justice	remains	strongly	committed	to	Polish	EU
membership,	an	argument	that	most	Poles	appear	to	accept:	a	March-April	CBOS	survey	found	that	only	17%	of
respondents	thought	that	the	government	wanted	‘Polexit’.	However,	Law	and	Justice	does	want	a	fundamental
re-think	of	the	trajectory	of	the	European	project	to	bring	the	EU	back	to	its	original	role	as	a	looser	alliance	of
economically	co-operating	sovereign	nation-states	with	a	more	consensual	decision	making	process.	The
government’s	supporters	argue	that	it	has	found	itself	in	conflict	with	the	EU	establishment	because	it	has	been
robust	and	assertive	in	defending	and	advancing	Poland’s	national	interests	within	the	Union.
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Law	and	Justice	has	shifted	away	from	its	Civic	Platform-led	predecessor’s	strategy	of	trying	to	locate	Poland
within	the	so-called	European	‘mainstream’	and	prioritising	the	development	of	close	relations	with	the	main	EU
powers,	especially	Germany.	Rather,	the	party	argues	that	Poland	needs	to	form	its	‘own	stream’	within	the	EU
by,	for	example,	building	alternative	alliances	with	central	and	East	European	post-communist	states	to	counter-
balance	the	influence	of	the	Franco-German	axis.	They	cite	US	President	Donald	Trump’s	July	visit	to	Poland,	his
first	stop	in	Europe	on	only	his	second	overseas	trip	since	assuming	office,	as	an	implicit	endorsement	of	Law
and	Justice’s	new	approach.	As	well	as	making	a	keynote	speech	praising	Poland	as	a	key	American	ally,	Mr
Trump	addressed	a	Warsaw	meeting	of	the	so-called	‘Three	Seas	Initiative’,	a	Polish-led	scheme	to	develop	co-
operation	and	solidarity	among	East	European	states.
EU	support	is	shallow	and	increasingly	instrumental
Moreover,	Polish	public	support	for	the	EU	appears	to	be	very	broad	but	also	rather	shallow	with	many	Poles
critical	of	attempts	to	deepen	European	integration	in	a	number	of	areas.	For	example,	a	March-April	CBOS
survey	found	that	72%	of	respondents	were	against	Polish	adoption	of	the	euro,	with	only	22%	in	favour.	The
same	survey	found	that	43%	of	Poles	felt	that	defending	the	independence	of	member	states	should	be	given
priority	compared	with	31%	who	favoured	limiting	national	sovereignty	to	ensure	the	EU’s	effectiveness.
Poles	also	appear	to	be	increasingly	instrumental	in	their	approach	towards	EU	membership.	A	key	motivation	for
their	voting	overwhelmingly	for	Poland’s	EU	accession	in	a	2003	referendum	was	the	idea	it	represented	a
historical	and	civilisational	choice	to	re-unite	with	the	West	and	the	culmination	of	the	post-communist
democratisation	process.	One	of	the	main	reasons	why	levels	of	popular	support	for	the	country’s	EU
membership	remained	so	high	was	that	many	Poles,	especially	among	the	older	generations,	saw	the	European
integration	process	as	part	of	a	symbolic	re-uniting	of	Poland	with	a	Western	international	community	of	shared
values	that	they	had	always	considered	themselves	to	be	part	of	culturally	and	spiritually.
However,	this	idea	of	EU	membership	as	a	natural	and	obvious	civilisational	choice	has	come	under	strain	in
recent	years	due	to	an	increasing	sense	of	cultural	distinctiveness	that	many	Poles	feel	in	relation	to	Western
Europe.	This	is	particularly	evident	in	the	sphere	of	moral-cultural	values	where	Polish	attachment	to	traditional
morality	and	national	identity	stands	in	stark	contrast	to	the	socially	liberal,	cosmopolitan	consensus	that
predominates	among	West	European	cultural	and	political	elites.
This	issue	surfaced	in	the	contrasting	reactions	of	Poles	(and	other	Central	Europeans)	to	the	European
migration	crisis.	A	May	2017	CBOS	survey	found	that	70%	of	Poles	were	against	accepting	refugees	(never	mind
economic	migrants)	from	Muslim	countries	and	only	25%	in	favour;	with	65%	still	opposed	even	if	Poland	was
threatened	with	financial	penalties.	Poland	is	an	overwhelmingly	Catholic	country	with	very	few	ethnic	minorities
and	little	experience	of	the	modern	migrations	that	have	transformed	Western	Europe.	Poles	are	keen	to	avoid
the	kind	of	cultural	and	security	problems	that	many	of	them	feel	West	European	countries	have	experienced
through	admitting	large	numbers	of	Muslim	migrants	who	are	seen	as	difficult	to	assimilate	and	embedding	violent
extremists	within	their	communities.
Polish	support	for	EU	membership	is,	therefore,	driven	increasingly	by	the	tangible	material	benefits	that	the
Union	is	felt	to	deliver,	but	there	are	signs	that	these	will	be	more	limited	in	the	future.	Among	these	perceived
benefits	are	the	sizeable	fiscal	transfers	that	the	country	receives,	particularly	EU	regional	aid	of	which	Poland	is
currently	the	largest	beneficiary	and	which	many	Polish	commentators	see	as	crucial	to	its	economic
modernisation.	The	current	EU	budget,	which	runs	until	2020,	was	always	likely	to	be	the	last	from	which	Poland
would	benefit	so	substantially	and	Brexit	will	almost	certainly	limit	the	scale	of	these	fiscal	transfers	even	further	in
the	future.
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Another	main	pillar	of	support	for	EU	membership	was	the	ability	that	it	afforded	Poles	to	travel	to	and	work	in
Western	Europe.	However,	concern	about	un-controlled	mass	EU	migration	was	an	important	driver	of	support	for
Brexit	and,	as	Mr	Macron’s	proposal	to	limit	the	rights	of	‘delegated’	workers	shows,	there	will	almost	certainly	be
more	attempts	to	restrict	Poles’	access	to	labour	markets	in	other	EU	countries.	Supporters	of	EU	membership
point	to	the	importance	of	Polish	access	to	the	single	market	for	trade	and	attracting	inward	investment,	but	this
argument	may	be	too	abstract	for	Poles	to	grasp.	Moreover,	while	many	feel	that	the	country’s	geo-political
situation	requires	membership	of	Western	international	organisations,	they	may	also	conclude	this	is	best
secured	through	NATO	rather	than	the	EU	which	is	not	a	credible	military	security	actor.
Potential	for	Euroscepticism?
Although	they	are	still	overwhelmingly	pro-EU,	many	Poles	share	Law	and	Justice’s	concerns	about	the	trajectory
of	the	European	project.	Interestingly,	a	June	poll	conducted	by	the	IBRiS	agency	for	the	‘Polityka’	journal	found
that	51%	of	respondents	actually	supported	leaving	the	EU	if	it	was	the	only	way	to	prevent	Poland	from	being
forced	to	admit	Muslim	migrants.	A	particularly	ominous	sign	for	Polish	EU	enthusiasts	is	the	fact	that	the
younger,	post-accession	generation	of	Poles	are	easily	the	most	anti-EU	demographic:	a	March-April	CBOS
survey	found	that	22%	of	18-24	year-olds	opposed	EU	membership	compared	with	an	average	of	9%	among	all
respondents.	So	while	there	is	no	imminent	prospect	of	the	government	seeking,	or	the	public	supporting,
‘Polexit’,	all	of	this	creates	the	potential	for	an	increase	in	Polish	Euroscepticism	in	the	future.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	A	version	of	this	article	appears	at	Aleks	Szczerbiak’s	personal	blog.	The	article	gives	the	views	of
the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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